Alcohol Industry Funding and the Research Community : Reply to Commentaries by Andréasson, Sven & McCambridge, Jim
Andreasson 2     (July 2016)     1









Alcohol Industry Funding and the Research Community: Reply to Commentaries

	The decades-long tobacco industry conspiracy to subvert science (Francey & Chapman, 2000; Godlee et al., 2013; McCambridge, 2016) is not a million miles away from alcohol research. The alcohol industry is certainly not a monolith (Holden et al., 2012); it is constantly changing in ways designed to maximize profit, and recent changes herald the prospect that the world’s largest alcohol company will be part owned by a tobacco company (Collin et al., 2015). The recent announcement from Anheuser-Busch InBev (2014), multinational beer producer, that they will invest at least 1 billion U.S. dollars over the coming 10 years in one aspect (social marketing) of corporate social responsibility activities, promoting the notion of “smart drinking,” provides us with an up-to-date perspective on the huge resources available to just one of the commercial actors in the alcohol field.
	The issue of alcohol industry funding of research has been the subject of commentaries for some time, yet evidence of the effects of alcohol industry funding of research has been scarce (McCambridge & Hartwell, 2015). It would obviously be a mistake to ignore what is known about industry funding of research in other areas (McGarity & Wagner, 2012). The beliefs held about the Alcoholic Beverage Medical Research Foundation (ABMRF) model, or as articulated in the INEBRIA position statement notwithstanding the evidence-based report in which it is based, are amenable to empirical study, and this deserves to be a research priority.
	In their commentary, Adams and Livingstone (2016—this issue) see little distinction between state and private sector funding, even though the aim of public health–motivated alcohol monopolies is to reduce alcohol-related harm, and there is ample evidence that they can be effective policy tools (Norström et al., 2010). In our view there is a world of difference in accepting funding from these state enterprises and private corporations, whose aims are contrary to public health.
	There is relatively little publicly funded money available to study how to address the societal and public health damage done by alcohol given how big the problem is (McCambridge, 2012). The commentaries disagree about how this should be rectified. We see this as an important and related, yet distinct, issue; plentiful funding would not remove the threat of bias attributable to industry funding.
	The exercise of influence is subtle, and normative guidance is needed for the making of necessarily complex decisions about accepting the risks involved in receipt of industry funding. In these circumstances, the INEBRIA position statement offers a precautionary approach to a set of issues that, with few exceptions (Babor, 2009; Jernigan, 2012) have not received the attention they deserve. It would be negligent on the part of the alcohol research community not to undertake such study, which can provide a firm evidence base to guide future decision-making about industry funding.
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